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Abstract
This paper examines how the opportunity costs of the leaders of a national protest movement, and
the intrinsic pacism of the occupier, a¤ect the nature of the movement against occupation. A two-
stage game is modeled, in which a protest leader and the external occupier ght over the control of
the population of an occupied region. The occupier can choose a level of force to punish the leader
and other participants of the protest movement. The leaders of the protest can actively convert the
populace to protest. The ndings of this paper indicate that under certain circumstances leaders who
have a greater opportunity cost of leading protests may be more active, compared to leaders with lower
opportunity costs. Further, the former may be able to lead a movement with more mass support. This
paper also characterizes equilibria where a less pacist occupier can actually de-escalate the conict
with the protestors. The characteristics of the population residing in the occupied region, the nature of
punishment that is being meted out to the protestors, and the structure of enforcement costs that lead
to these outcomes, are discussed in the paper.
JEL Classication Numbers: D72, D74, D78.
Keywords: Conict, Protest, Revolt.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The aim of this paper is to analyze how the nature of a national protest or liberation movement, against
external occupation, might be a¤ected by the nature of decision-makers on both sides of the conict. On
one side of the conict, there are the protest leaders leading the protest movement against occupation. On
the other side, there are the leaders of the occupying force (maybe a government or a prime decision-maker).
This paper is motivated by two seemingly counter-intuitive outcomes that have been known to occur in the
past, namely: (i) a protest leader whose opportunity cost may be very high, but he or she still very actively
leads a powerful protest movement; (ii) an occupier whose level of aggression is very high, but he or she
still faces a strong protest. Based on these two observations, two corresponding questions are studied in this
paper. First, how is the nature of a protest movement a¤ected by the opportunity costs of the protest leaders
who lead these movements? Second, how is the nature of the protest movement a¤ected by the degree of
pacism of the leaders of occupiers? In order to simplify the analysis, I will henceforth assume that the
I am grateful to Oscar Volij and Brent Kreider for comments on a previous version of the paper. The usual disclaimer
applies.
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protest movement is led by a representative leader, known as the protest leader. On the other hand, I
assume the occupying force is lead by a central authority, henceforth known as the occupier.
Before proceeding further, let me clarify what I mean by the phrase nature of a protest movement. In the
model analyzed in this paper, the nature of a protest movement (or uprising) is described by: (i). The level
of activity by the protest leader; and (ii). The level of mass participation by the population of the occupied
region. In this context, when I mention the level of activity by the protest leader, I am not asserting
that the protest leader undertakes any specic kind of activity. Her activity, which I have tried to broadly
capture in this model, may include a certain combination (in various degrees) of propaganda, holding rallies
or marches, non-cooperation, direct attacks, and other acts normally seen in revolts.
What is the motivation behind the rst question related to opportunity costs? Opportunity costs of protest
leaders include both economic and non-economic cost components like nancial, professional, psychological,
moral, familial and social costs. Given the di¤erent social, economic, professional and political backgrounds
of protest leaders in history, their opportunity costs for leading protest movements, have been di¤erent.
This is observed by studying the contrasting leadership elements in the Indian Freedom Struggle, the Irish
Republican Movement, the Israel-Palestinian Conict, the Kashmir Separatist Movement, and numerous
others. For example, in the case of the Indian Independence Struggle, the moral values of Gandhi and the
socioeconomic background of Nehru (hence their opportunity costs of protest) were quite di¤erent from those
of the previous leaders of the Congress Party.1 Yet they were able to lead a more successful independence
struggle, with greater mass-support, compared to the latter. Historical facts like these lead us to the rst
question. As will be seen from the model, it is possible for leaders with greater opportunity cost to be more
active and lead protests with more mass-support. Possibilities for such a seemingly counter-intuitive outcome
may arise in a multi-agent game because the leadersstrategy may depend not only on their opportunity
cost, but also on the strategy of the occupier. A contribution of this paper lies in identifying the specics
of the environment that make this outcome possible. It is identied how certain factors, like the intrinsic
population characteristics of the occupied area, the nature of the punishment inicted on the protest leaders,
and enforcement costs, contribute to these outcomes.
The second question, related to the degree of pacism of the occupier, is driven by the fact that in many
real world conicts, the command of occupying forces has been transferred between governments that have
di¤erent attitudes towards the protestors. For example, the Labor governments in Israel have generally been
more pacist compared to Likud governments in dealing with Palestinian uprisings. In this paper I have
characterized equilibria where having a less pacist occupier may lead to the escalation of the protest. As
1Note that when the Non-Cooperation Movement (1920-22) got out of hand, and led to violence, the moral costs for Gandhi
were so great that he actually suspended the movement. As for Nehru, he belonged to the Anglicized upper class, and had
strong social ties with the British elites. These ties became strained when he joined the independence movement.
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before, I have identied the primitives (including the population characteristics and the nature of punishment)
that give rise to these equilibria.
In order to study the questions raised in this paper, I have modeled a two-stage game, in which a protest
leader and the external occupier ght over the control of the population mass of the occupied region, with
the occupier having a rst-mover advantage and the protest leader moving in the second stage of the game.
This game is analyzed in Section 2. 2 Notable contributions in this area include Grossmans (1991) model
of insurrections and his study of kleptocracy and revolution (1991). Roemers (1985) article, in which he
rationalizes revolutionary ideology as a strategic device of the revolutionary leaders (rather than any intrinsic
pre-commitment on their part), is also signicant. Kuran (1989) identies that preference falsication by
the masses might be a reason why some of the major revolutions in history seem to be sudden occurrences,
without prior warnings of social discontent. Esteban & Ray (1999) discuss the links between the level and
pattern of social conict and the level of polarization in society.
The above literature recognizes the importance of leadership in the revolutionary process. However, to the
best of my knowledge, these contributions have not adequately studied the impact of opportunity costs of
revolutionary leaders on the conict process.3 Thus, one of the contributions of this paper lies in the incor-
poration of opportunity costs (where such costs might even be non-pecuniary or non-economic in nature).
Further, how conict processes have been inuenced by the degree of pacism of the occupier, is also an
issue that has not received due attention in the literature. Yet, as seen in the earlier discussion of historical
facts, these factors are present and pertinent in most anti-occupation struggles. A clear understanding of
the impact of these factors is crucial to the understanding of such conicts. The current paper seeks to ll
this gap in the literature. I will demonstrate that the answers to the two questions analyzed in this paper
depend a great deal on certain underlying population characteristics, and the nature of punishment that is
being inicted. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is unique in demonstrating the connection between
these fundamental population characteristics, the intrinsic nature of punishment, the opportunity cost of
protest leaders, and the pacism of the occupier - in determining the nature of a protest movement.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 analyzes protest and its control as a two-player game
between the occupier and protest leader. Section 3 analyzes how the nature of a protest movement is a¤ected
2Other authors have also used sequential games to study various aspects of conict, protest, revolution and repression. For
surveys of this literature see Hartley and Sandler (1995), Garnkel and Skaperdas (1996), Sandler and Hartley (2004).
3Though some (Grossman, 1991 & 1999, and Hirshleifer, 2000, among others) have recognized that the presence of competing
productive activities would impact the participation of the masses (peasant or worker families in Grossmans papers) in
revolutionary activities. This focus of Grossmans papers, however, is to model the behavior of the masses in the revolutionary
process - and not the behavior of revolutionary leaders. Further, it is interesting to note that Grossman does not explicitly
include the role of punishment in his model of insurrection - an aspect included in this paper. Roemer (1985) does incorporate
punishment in his model of revolution (as part of which he models the decision process of revolutionary leaders), but disregards
the presence of competing productive opportunities for the revolutionaries. Hirshleifer (2000) models conict between rival
rulers in his study of conict technology, but ignores the behavior of the rulerssubjects. Further, Hirschliefers model does not
incorporate the notion of punishment, as it primarily analyzes conict in the context of territorial conquest and expansion.
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by the opportunity costs of the protest leader and the pacism of the occupier. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Protest and its control as a two player game
2.1 Players, decision variables, and the payo¤ structure
There are two players, the protest leader and the occupier. The decision variables of these players are an
activity leveland permissiveness levelrespectively. Let a and c denote these respective decision variables.
Let a 2 [0; 1]  A; and c 2 [0; 1]  A0, with 0 being the least and 1 the highest possible level in either case.
The objective of both players is to maximize their own payo¤ arising from the revenues and costs that will
arise due to their own action and that of their opponent. I will discuss below how such revenues and costs
are generated. An environment of perfect information and common knowledge is assumed throughout the
paper.
The protest leader and the occupier are the key players in the model. There is also a xed population
mass residing in this region. A certain percentage of the total population mass gets converted to protest,
depending on the playersstrategies.4
Let f denote the conversion function, which maps every pair (a; c) to a population percentage in the interval
[0; 100]:5
f : AA0  ! [0; 100]
The function f is assumed to have the following properties:
A1. Conversion E¤ect of Activity: f is strictly increasing and concave in a, i.e., fa > 0; faa < 0:
A2. Conversion E¤ect of Permissiveness: f is strictly increasing and convex in c, i.e., fc > 0; fcc > 0:
The rst assumption states that the decision of a greater level of protest activity by the leadership converts
a greater percentage of the population to protest.6 More activity by the leader (such as propaganda activity
or direct attacks) might persuade more people to join her cause. 7 It is assumed that there are decreasing
marginal returns to a with respect to conversion. In other words, the conversion function behaves like a
4 In what follows we ignore the free-rider problem associated with collective action. In reality, such problems have been
overcome in many historical contexts. We refer the reader to Sandler (1992), for a survey of various means by which the
collective action problem has been overcome in numerous situations.
5This function bears resemblance to the contest success functionsused by Skaperdas (1996), and Hirshleifer (2000). It is to
be noted, though, that contest success functions are essentially probability functions, denoting the chance of success in contests.
6 It may be assumed that the converted people indulge in the same level of activity as the protest leader. That, however,
is not important: one might also assume that the leader asks the converted mass to engage in a certain given level of protest
activity.
7There is another way in which assumption A1 may be justied. Under certain situations, a leader with a higher decision
level of activity might be able to coerce a greater percentage of the population to side with them, especially if that activity is
violent in nature. In that case, the populace might be more fearful of her than a leader with a lower decision level (of violence).
In such a scenario, though the population may not itself be indulging in protest activities, they would be lending tacitsupport
out of fear to the violence undertaken by the leader. This situation is in fact akin to the situation in Kashmir during 2002,
where militants coerced the population by indulging in violent activities, both against the population and the controlling forces.
This created an atmosphere of terror under which the population was fearful of participating in democratic activities. This fact
of non-participation was then used by the militant organizations in international fora to gain political mileage.
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usual production function, as far as input a is concerned.
The second assumption states that if the occupier is more permissive, for a given decision level of activity by
the protest leader, then the population mass takes advantage of that fact and converts to protest in greater
numbers. It may be reasonably argued that there are increasing marginal returns to conversion with regard
to the level of permissiveness of the occupier.
Note that the nature of the conversion function gives information regarding the nature of the population of
the occupied region. For example, how susceptible is the population to revolutionary propaganda? This can
be measured, for specied functional forms, by the elasticity of the conversion function with respect to a.
How would the population react to a lessening of controls by the occupier? It is possible to measure this by
the elasticity of the conversion function with respect to c, for specied functional forms.
Depending on the percentage of the population converted to protest, a certain amount of revenue (political
gains for example) R accrues to the protest leader and R0 to the occupier. For the protest leader, it is
assumed this revenue is a linear function of f;R = !f . The occupiers revenue level R0 depends on the
percentage of the population not converted to protest and is R0 = (100  f), where  > 0.
I will now describe the playerscosts. These costs from their own action and that of their opponent. There
is a punishment functionp which maps every pair (a; c) to a punishment level P 2 [0;1):The function p
describes the technology of punishment. Punishment is a cost for the protest leader and is administered by
the occupier.
p : AA0  ! [0;1)
Let P = p(a; c) where  is a scaling parameter. So, punishment P is a monotonic transformation of p.
The function p is assumed to reect the following properties:
A3. Punishment E¤ect of Activity: p is strictly increasing and convex in a, i.e., pa > 0; paa > 0:
A4. Punishment E¤ect of Permissiveness : p is strictly decreasing and convex in c, i.e., pc < 0; pcc > 0:
It is assumed that given a level of permissiveness, punishment increases for an increase in activity. Also, the
punishment schedule p is such that the marginal rate of punishment increases with the level of activity.
The assumption of punishment e¤ect of permissiveness is based on the logic that any credible punishment
level should depend not only on the level of activity of the protest leadership, but also on the occupiers action.
This assumption requires that for any level of activity by the protest leader the punishment delivered is more,
if the occupier was less permissive. Now, what is measured by the permissiveness parameter c? Parameter c
measures the level of military or police provision by the controller.8 A larger, better equipped, and deployed
8To deliver a certain level of punishment (for a given activity level) there needs to be an appropriate force to apprehend
the protestors. In other words, the level of policing is very important - the size of the police and military, their equipage, and
proper deployment is essential in apprehending the protestors. These combined features are captured in the variable c; the level
of permissiveness.
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military or police force would lead to less permissiveness, or a lower c in our model. It is assumed that
punishment decreases at an increasing rate for greater permissiveness.
Thus, the level of actual punishment that might be credibly meted out would depend on the actions of
both the players. The punishment function recognizes that the activities of both the concerned parties need
to be taken into account, since actual punishment would not only depend on protest activity, but also on
the level of policing. For further discussions on desirable features of punishment technology see Becker
(1968) and Mookherjee & Png (1994). We note that the punishment function gives information regarding
the characteristics of the punishment being delivered by the occupier. For example, are successive increases
in punishment very harsh for increases in protest activity (which may be measured by the elasticity of the
conversion function with respect to a)? If the occupier reduces the size of its army, is its ability to punish
greatly diminished (which may be measured by the elasticity of the conversion function with respect to c)?
Lastly, there are no special restrictions on the cross-partials of the conversion and punishment functions,
or fac T 0 and pac T 0. These assumptions regarding the conversion and punishment functions mean that
as permissiveness increases, the marginal e¤ect of activity by the leadership on conversion and punishment
may either increase or decrease. Thus, more permissiveness might or might not increase the receptiveness of
the population to the activities of the protest leader. Similarly, as more permissive environment might mean
that punishment is less for protest activities in absolute terms, but the marginal increase for more activity
might not necessarily be lower.
I will now discuss a very important feature of the model. There is a opportunity costC of a certain activity
level for the protest leader, in addition to the punishment cost mentioned earlier. There is a function which
maps every a 2 [0; 1] to a opportunity cost space C, or C =  g(a) where  is a nite positive scalar.
Opportunity costs are increasing and convex in the level of activity, i.e. ga > 0; gaa > 0: The incorporation
of this opportunity cost distinguishes our model from those of previous authors. The reasons why such costs
might arise have already been discussed in detail.
Coming to the cost structure of the occupier, there is an enforcement costE for administering punishment
to the leadership group. This cost is given by E(P ) = P . This cost includes not only the pecuniary costs
of provisioning the army, but also other non-pecuniary costs like international sanctions and boycotts that
the occupier faces for taking action against the protestors.9
Using notation developed above, the payo¤ of the protest leader can be written as:
(a; c) = R  C   P = !f   C   P = !f(a; c)   g(a)  p(a; c)
The occupiers payo¤ is:
9A real-world example of such non-pecuniary costs would be the international pressures faced by Israel for its actions to
control Palestinian uprisings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Of course, international sanctions may have pecuniary losses
(like loss in international trade) as well.
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(a; c) = R0   E = (100  f)  P
= [100  f(a; c)]  p(a; c), where  = 
Do protest leaders and the occupiers in the actual world really try to maximize payo¤ functions similar to
the ones described above? While there is little doubt that considerations of punishment and costs would
gure in their decisions, there might be some debate whether these players would attach much importance
to the level of population being converted to protest. Even though there is a connection between the success
of a protest movement and the level of mass participation, critics might argue that the exact nature of this
connection is open to debate. Their argument might be that the fundamental objective of the protest leader is
to achieve independence, so her payo¤ function should explicitly reect this particular objective, rather than
the objective of converting the population to protest. While acknowledging some of the criticsconcerns,
I believe that the payo¤ functions outlined above capture the essence of the day-to-day decision making
processes of the leaders in many independence movements. As an example, in the Indian Independence
Movement, for a long period the ultimate goal of independence seemed to be distant and elusive. The daily
focus and activities of the independence leaders was geared more towards disseminating the idea of self-rule
and building a nationwide mass movement.10 As this paper does not seek to model the entire revolutionary
process, from conception to culmination, but only seeks to capture a snapshot of the process (in which I
analyze certain characteristics of an ongoing movement), the payo¤ functions used in the model are suitable.
2.2 The two person game and its solution
It seems logical to model the game between the protest leader and the occupier as a sequential, rather than a
simultaneous move game. A police force or army needs to be in place beforehand in order to apprehend and
deter the protesters. In the real word, governments decide and employ their armies a priori, in anticipation
of attacks.11 However, attacks still take place, even after the attackers account for the police presence. In
order to model this situation, I will consider a two-stage perfect information game, with the occupier acting
in the rst stage and the protest leader doing so in the second stage. The players get to act only once in
this model. The occupier has complete information about the protest leaderships best response to its own
strategy. After observing the occupiers action, the protest leader maximizes her payo¤ in the second stage
of the game.
I will solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-player game through backward induction. In the
second stage, the protest leader solves the problem:
10The focus of the Non-Cooperation Movement (1918-22) against the British, led by Gandhi, seems to be an example of this.
he British historian Nigel Harris documents the events and occurrences of British India during this period in his book National
Liberation(1990).
Some details may also be found at the following Indian history website: <http://www.nos.org/ss10/ss4h24.1.htm>.
11 In a related context, police patrols are put in place in criminal neighborhoods before robberies take place. If the authorities
decide whether to employ the police at the time of robberies, criminals would not be either apprehended or deterred.
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Maximize:fag  = !f(a; c)   g(a)  p(a; c); 0  a  1
such that:   0:
The FOC for an interior solution to the protest leaderships problem is:
!fa(a; c
)   ga(a)  pa(a; c) = 0
The solution to the above equation gives the reaction function of the protest leadership:
a = a(c; !;  ; )
Lemma 1. @a

@ < 0 always.
12
This implies that if the cost of activity increases, ceteris paribus, the protest leader will curtail activity.
Lemma 2. The reaction function of the protest leader is positively (negatively) sloped, i.e. @a

@c ? 0; i¤
!fac   pac ? 0:13
When the reaction function is positively (negatively) sloped, a and c are strategic complements (substitutes)
for the protest leader. From lemma 2, it is seen that for strategic complementarity, there should be a positive
marginal gain in the protest leaders payo¤ for an increase in permissiveness, even with some increase in
their activity. On the other hand, for strategic substitutes, there would be a positive gain for increase in
permissiveness, only by cutting back on activity. If however, permissiveness were to decline, more activity
could be substituted for permissiveness in order to maintain payo¤ levels.
The occupiers decision problem occurs in the rst stage of the game. The occupier solves:
Maximize:fcg  = [100  f(a; c)]  p(a; c); 0  c  1
such that:   0:
The FOC for an interior solution to the occupiers problem is:
 [fa + pa ]@a@c   [fc + pc)] = 0  F
The solution to this equation gives us c = c(a; ; ):
The subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is the strategy pair (a; c) which satisfy the simultaneous
solution of the FOCs of the protest leader and the occupier:14
Condition C2. As fa ; pa ; fc > 0; and pc < 0; a solution to the problem exists for @a

@c > 0 only if
 jpcj >  jfcj and for @a@c < 0 only if  jpcj <  jfcj at equilibrium.
12As @a

@ 
=
ga
!faa  gaa paa ; the result follows from the assumptions regarding the partials.
13Since @a

@c = hc =  
!:fac :pac
!:faa  :gaa :paa and the denominator is always negative.
14For conditions for which there is a subgame perfect equilibrium to games of perfect information (as in this model) see
Harris (1985). The assumptions with respect to the second partials of the conversion, communication, and punishment cost
functions ensure that the payo¤ function of the protest leader is strictly concave in her strategies. I assume that the following
su¢ ciency condition for the strict concavity of the occupiers maximand function w.r.t. c is satised at (a; c):  [(faa +
paa )(ac)2 + (fa + pa )acc + (fcc + pcc)] < 0: The satisfaction of this condition does not violate the assumptions
regarding the partials of the conversion and punishment functions. For the reaction function of the protest leader being strictly
monotonic, the equilibrium to this game will be unique. Further, this second order condition can hold simultaneously with the
conditions outlined in the main propositions of the model, for su¢ ciently high values of fcc and pcc, even without imposing
strong restrictions on the values of acc:
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This is because the term [fa +pa ] in the above expression is always positive, hence the term [fc+pc]
needs to be suitably positive or negative, according as ac is negative or positive for the FOC of the occupier
to hold in equilibrium.15
3 Implications of the model
3.1 The e¤ect of leadership type on the nature of protest
A protest leader having an intrinsically greater opportunity cost of decision at every level of protest activity
is dened as a higher-costleader.
Denition 1. (Higher-Cost Leader): Protest leader i is dened to be higher-costthan leader j if  i >  j.
Protest leader i having  i >  j has higher opportunity costs of any level of protest activity than leader
j. Recall that  is the weighting parameter of the opportunity cost function, in the payo¤ of the protest
leadership. From historical examples, a higher opportunity cost leadership might have either economic, or
psychological, or moral costs of greater protest activity. For example, in the Indian Independence Movement,
Nehrus opportunity cost of leading the independence movement had a great deal of non-economic social
cost for him. Given that Nehru was educated in Britain, was a barrister, and was intimate in the highest
British social circles, his decision to engage in anti-British activities had certain opportunity costs for him.
These costs increased as he distanced himself more and more from the British by engaging more and more
in the independence struggle. Needless to say, these opportunity costs were not present for other leaders
without Nehrus social connections.
I will analyze below how the equilibrium level of protest activity and popular participation changes when a
movement is lead by a higher opportunity cost leadership, versus a lower opportunity cost one. For this, I
will consider the e¤ect of a variation of  on the equilibrium level of activity and mass participation. But
before performing this exercise, let me dene how the level of mass support for a protest movement will be
measured.
Remark. A protest movement is dened has greater mass-supportvis-a-vis another, if the level of conversion
f is higher in the former compared to the latter.
The above remark simply states that the equilibrium level of conversion (measured by the equilibrium value
given by the conversion function) measures the level of mass support for the protest movement. A movement
with more mass support will have a higher f.
The following propositions characterize equilibria where activity rises for the leadership moving to the hands
15A diagrammatic representation of the equilibrium is available upon request. The interested reader can also check that
an upward sloping reaction function for the protest leader implies a comparatively low c and vice versa. This is seen by
computing the equations for the iso-utility curves of the occupier and observing that along the negatively (positively ) sloped
stretches of those curves, fc + pc is positive (negative). Combining this with condition C2 gives the desired result.
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of a higher-cost group. It will be observed that it is not automatic that a higher-cost leadership will indulge
in less activity.16 I will also analyze the mass supportlevel of the protest movement in each case. It will
be possible to conclude on the nature of conversion and punishment functions that lead to these results. As
mentioned before, the nature of these functions shed light on the nature of the population,17 and the type
of punishment, that need to exist for these outcomes to occur.
Proposition 1: For a and c being strategic complements (i.e. @a

@c > 0) for the protest leader, a leader with
higher opportunity costs will be more active compared to ones with lower opportunity cost if: (i). @
2a
@ @c < 0;
(ii). 
 @2p@a2  >   @2f@a2  at c; and (iii).@a@c dcd  > @a@  : Under these conditions, the protest movement has
greater mass-support for a higher-cost leader.
Proof: See appendix 1. 
What is the interpretation of this proposition? First, recall from lemma 2 that for a and c being strategic
complements, if the occupier decreases its troops, the protest leader needs to increase e¤ort to recruit more
followers and increase her payo¤ level. Note that the case of strategic complementarity arises if the gain
in conversion (in a situation of both greater activity and permissiveness) more than o¤sets the change in
punishment.18 This fact reveals that the populace of this region is not very keen on rebellion, and even in
face of greater permissiveness, the leader needs to spend more e¤ort converting them.
From the proof of the above proposition, note that the occupier is more permissive for a higher cost leadership.
Now, what are the circumstances that would make the occupier more permissive for a higher opportunity cost
leadership? For this to happen, certain conditions have to be met, as seen from the above proposition. First,
the condition @
2a
@ @c < 0 implies that for a higher-cost leadership, the reaction function (@a
=@c) should be
steeper (if a is measured on the horizontal and c on the vertical axis of a graph), compared to a lower-cost
one. So, higher opportunity costs make the former less reactive to (or less willing to take advantage of)
greater permissiveness. The occupier certainly considers this fact when deciding to be more permissive.
Second, notice that 
 @2p@a2  >   @2f@a2 , which implies that the rate of increase in enforcement costs will be
higher than the conversion rate, for a rise in the protest leaders activities As the occupier does not want
this inationary pressure on enforcement costs to hugely deplete its payo¤, it increases permissiveness. Note
that it is possible for the occupier to increase permissiveness and cut back on punishment, hence saving
enforcement costs.19 Recall that in this particular case, the higher-cost protest leader is less reactive to
16Note that any leader with  i >  j ts our denition of being higher-cost. The following propositions outline conditions
where a higher-cost leader (satisfying those conditions) would indulge in more activity. They do not claim that any higher-cost
leader would be more active. Indeed, that would not make sense, since for su¢ ciently large values of  , the cost of activity
would be so high that very low activity would result.
17For example, their susceptibility to the propaganda and other activities of the protest leader.
18Note that for an increase in both activity and permissiveness, punishment could either increase or decrease. For an increase,
an o¤estting increase in conversion would be required for the payo¤ of the protest leader to increase.
19One might wonder why the occupier reduces policing, rather than making the more fundamental decision of adjusting the
punishment function, and instructing the existing police force to punish less, for any given activity level. However, the occupier
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greater permissiveness. It is also seen that the rate of conversion (hence the rate of loss to the occupier
from conversion) is not that high. Given these facts, the occupier is able to save on enforcement costs (and
actually increase its payo¤ level) by reducing the level of its policing, and reducing confrontation with the
protest leader.20 In this scenario, with the occupier becoming more permissive when faced with a higher-cost
protest leader, the latter is more active than a lower-cost one.21
A nal condition needs to be satised for greater activity by the higher-cost leader. Her opportunity cost
must not be too high. This makes sense, as for su¢ ciently large values of  , the opportunity cost would be
so high that we would observe very low activity. In fact, higher opportunity costs have a negative impact on
the activity decision of a higher-cost leader. But, for the result outlined in proposition 1, these costs must
not be so high as to violate the condition
@a@c dcd  > @a@ . The left hand term in this inequality denotes the
positive e¤ect of the occupiers increasing permissiveness on activity level. The right hand term denotes the
negative e¤ect of greater opportunity cost on their activity 22 Finally, we observe that the protest movement
has greater mass-support under these circumstances, as both permissiveness and activity level go up.
Some stylized facts of history provide a reality check of the above ndings. During the Indian Independence
movement, during the period 1900-47, many leaders of the Congress Party had close social ties with the
British.23 Given their high opportunity costs of indulging in protest, it was unlikely that the situation would
get out of hand, even if the British were more permissive. Also, some of these leaders like Gandhi and
Nehru, had great stature, and the cost of punishing them harshly was very costly for the British.24 Given
this, the British never really turned India into a garrison state, and the Congress Party was able to lead
a substantial movement.25 This situation is in sharp contrast to British policy in India in the mid-1800s,
when they faced uprisings by the remnants of Indias feudal class and rebellious units of the British Indian
might not want to dilute the laws requiring certain punishment for certain activities, if the police confront the protestors, at
all. In fact, this pre-committment is necessary to make the protestors fearful of a higher level of policing ( and plays a part in
containing protest). Reducing the police level to avoid confrontation may be a way for the occupier to reduce its enforcement
costs in this environment.
20A graphical analysis of this case is available on request. In the graph, it will observed that the reaction function of a for
a higher-cost leader is steeper than lower cost one. In that case, by increasing permissiveness the occupier moves to a higher
iso-utility curve, with a higher payo¤ level.
21 It must be remembered, though, that if the occupier were as permissive as this to a lower-cost leader then it would face
more activity in equilibrium. A lower-cost leader would indulge in less activity in equilibrium as she would face the deterrence
e¤ect of less permissiveness on the occupiers part.
22For explicit functional forms, the elasticities of the conversion and punishment functions with respect to a and c are crucial
in obtaining our result. The interested reader may obtain a numerical example from the author , which demonstrates the role
played by these elasticities.
23Others, like Gandhi, had moral attitudes that prevented an escalation of conict. These leaders feared such escalation could
cause the movement to get out of control, and result in violence, which they were rmly against. In fact, Gandhi cancelled the
Non-Cooperation Movement when it got out of hand, resulting in violence, even when it seemed to be succeeding against the
British.
24The role played by the cost of punishment seems to be signicant. The leaders of the Bengal Revolutionary Movement in
India (1907-30) were also students and intellectuals, and had high opportunity costs. But as they did not have international
visibility, the enforcement cost against them (in terms of international condemnation, etc.), was not much. So the British
employed very repressive tactics against them.
25See Ghosh (1998), Sarkar (2001), and Sharma (2005) for accounts of the evolution of the Indian independence movement.
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Army 26 The leaders of these uprisings did not have high opportunity costs of insurgency, given that they
were mostly dispossessed feudal nobility. The uprisings were quickly crushed with military force, and did
not spread largely to the common masses. In fact, due to the aggressive response of the British, relatively
few of the dispossessed nobility actually revolted - the majority did not revolt.27
Proposition 2: For a and c being strategic substitutes (i.e. @a

@c < 0) for protest a leader, a leader with higher
opportunity costs will be more active compared to ones with lower opportunity cost if: (i). @
2a
@ @c > 0; (ii). @2f@a2  <   @2p@a2  at c; and (iii).@a@c dcd  > @a@  : Under these conditions, the protest movement has lower
mass-support for a higher-cost leader.
Proof: The proof of the rst part of the proposition is similar to the proof of proposition 1. To prove the
second part of the statement suppose that the occupier was at utility level  for the lower-cost group, i.e.
when  was lower. In this case, for an increase in  , observe that the occupier maximizes its utility by
decreasing c as its best response. Let its utility level in the latter case be 0. But 0 > ; as the occupier
could have stayed at least at the utility level , but chose not to do so. This is because if the occupier
had remained at the initial level of c, given  had increased, a would have fallen (since @a

@ < 0 always).
Thus, given the assumptions of our model, the occupier would have remained at least at . Therefore, the
best-response reduction in c would only move it to a higher utility level. Now given pc < 0; pa > 0, a
rises, and c falls in equilibrium for a rise in  , 0 >  only if (100  f) is greater, i.e. f is lower than the
initial level. Hence, under the assumptions outlined in the proposition the protest movement is less mass
supported for a higher-cost leadership. 
The interpretation of this proposition is as follows. As a and c are strategic substitutes in this case, if
permissiveness declines, the protest leader can maintain her payo¤ is by increasing activity. Note that this
would happen only if the population were more receptive to the protest leaderships activities or propaganda
even in a less permissive environment.28 This might be expected to occur when a population is prone to
rebellion in the rst place.29 A word of caution - tI do not imply that more absolute numbers of people
convert to protest in a more oppressive environment. Peoples receptiveness to the protest leader goes up,
but the higher level of policing makes them afraid to join the protest. A combination of these two e¤ects
might mean that there are less converts in absolute terms. However, this number is still more than the
number that would have converted under greater policing, had their receptiveness stayed the same.
Coming to the occupier, in this particular case it is less permissive for a higher opportunity cost leadership.
26The most signicant uprising against the British during this period, known as the Sepoy Mutiny or the First War of Indian
Independence, occurred in 1857.
27The feudal nobility in India still retained their traditional role as social leaders till the latter part of the 19th century.
28So much so that the gain in conversion through greater activity in this less permissive environment would outweigh the
increase in punishment.
29Sometimes, more suppression by the occupier might make the population so antagonistic, that they would become more
receptive to the protest leader.
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The reasons why the occupier is less permissive are evident from the proposition. First, the condition
@2a
@ @c > 0 implies that for a higher-cost leadership, the reaction function (@a
=@c) is atter (if a is measured
on the horizontal and c on the vertical axis of a graph), compared to a lower-cost one. So, higher opportunity
costs make the former more willing to take advantage of permissiveness (or more reactive to it). So, being
permissive towards a high-cost leader is a bad alternative for the occupier, as it can really cause substantial
losses. This causes it to be less permissive.
The second condition
 @2f@a2  <   @2p@a2 , is equivalent to the one seen in proposition 1. However, as a and c
are strategic substitutes in this case, the interpretation is a bit di¤erent. Given that the occupier decreases
c here, the protest leader will increase a. It has already been seen in this case, that under conditions of less
permissiveness, people become more susceptible to revolutionary propaganda or other activities. However,
the second condition states that in spite of that, the responsiveness of the population to revolutionary
activities (their conversion) should not be too high, beyond a point. Thus, in absolute terms their rate of
conversion to the protest movement due to an increase in a (or @
2f
@a2 ) should be su¢ ciently low.
Finally, note that higher opportunity costs lead to lesser proclivity for activity (i.e.@a

@ < 0). But here, lesser
permissiveness forces the protest leader to substitute (in order to maintain a certain level of conversion),
and be more active. In fact this substitution requirement should be so great as to outweigh the negative
e¤ect higher costs have on their activity (
@a@c dcd  > @a@  needs to hold). Under these circumstances, a
higher-cost leader will be more active - though she will lead a movement with lower mass support compared
to a lower-cost leader.
A historical example of this would be the revolutionary activities launched by students and intellectuals
against Tsar Alexander III of Russia during the period1881-94.30 This revolutionary movement was launched
by small groups of students and intellectuals, and had high opportunity costs (due to their social background).
The Tsar adopted a high level of enforcement and employed very repressive tactics against them. However,
the revolutionaries saw their actions as the only hope for galvanizing the Russian people, and were very
active against the Tsar. However, their movement did not gain enough mass participation. On the other
hand, it seems that the revolutionary leadership in Russia during the period 1905-17 comprised more of
career politicians. As these leaders had adopted politics as a career, they arguably had lower opportunity
costs of leading political (protest) movements. These leaders were able to lead more widespread movements
against the Tsar, taking advantage of their lower opportunity costs (perhaps because of their natural ability
to lead political protest), even without being as active as the revolutionaries of the earlier period.
It may be noted from the discussion of the above propositions that increased activity by a higher opportunity
30Though this example is not exactly in the context of occupied regions, we see that some of the results of this paper may be
applied to more general settings as well.
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cost protest leaders can come about under two circumstances. In the rst case, the occupier realizes the
intrinsic proclivity of the higher-cost leaders to be less active, and is more permissive in order to save high
enforcement costs. The high-cost protest leaders are able to take advantage of this situation and operate
more freely (be more active) than low-cost ones (who would face greater enforcement as the government is
aware of their greater proclivity). Further, it is also evident (from proposition 1) that the high-cost protest
leaders are able to convert the population to protest more e¤ectively. This is because they are allowed by
the circumstances to be more active, and people in this region need to be exhorted a great deal, to join the
movement. In the second case, the occupier is less permissive towards the higher-cost leadership, and the
latter has to be more active just in order to keep the protest movement alive. It seems that in this case,
the general population is prone to join the movement, and the occupier has to guard against that. Due to
the controllers actions, the populace is afraid to come out and protest, even in spite of this receptiveness.
Thus, the protest leader has to be raise her e¤orts to win converts and preserve their movement to whatever
extent possible.
3.2 E¤ect of occupiers attitude on the nature of protest
In this section it will be analyzed how the nature of the movement a¤ected by the intrinsic level of pacism
of the occupier. It is assumed that a less pacist occupier punishes the protest leader more for the same level
of activity, compared to a more pacist occupier. Further, it is assumed that it is possible to deliver this
higher punishment with the given level of military or police, perhaps by instructing the existing force to act
tougher. This means that for any pair (a; c) the punishment P delivered by a less pacist occupier is greater
than the punishment delivered by one more pacist. In reality, there might be a change in the government
of the occupying nation, which might bring about a change in attitude towards the protest movement.
Denition 2. (Less-Pacist occupier): A occupier i is dened to be less-pacist than a occupier j if i
> j.
Recall that  is the weighting parameter of the punishment function. Note that if i > j , for any pair
(a; c), P i = ip(a; c) > P j = jp(a; c).31
Lemma 3. @a

@ < 0 always.
32
This implies that if punishment increases due to a rise in , ceteris paribus, the protest leader will curtail
activity. Also note that when the occupier becomes less pacist, there are two e¤ects for the protest leader.
31A less pacist occupier is simply one who has the proclivity to punish more. We observe from the payo¤ function of the
occupier, that inicting a higher punishment involves greater costs for the occupier, as enforcement cost E = P . Thus, a less
pacist occupier, who punishes more, will have greater punishment costs. This agrees with reality, where greater actions against
insurgents may entail more military casualties, greater international condemnation, and higher operational costs. Some critics
might suggest that enforcement costs are actually lower for a less pacist occupier. We would argue against their reasoning, as
it seems straightforward that enforcement costs (of the kind just mentioned) are greater for absolutely higher punishment.
32As @a

@
=
pa
!faa  gaa paa ; the result follows from the assumptions regarding the partials.
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First, for any given combination (a; c), their punishment rises. Further, a less pacist occupier might vary
the level of c as well, which would have a further e¤ect on punishment.33
The following propositions consider the e¤ect of a variation of  on the equilibrium level of activity and
mass participation. Equilibria where protest activity rises for a less pacist occupier, are characterized. As
before, it is possible to analyze the nature of the population and the type of punishment that need to exist,
for these outcomes to occur.
Proposition 3: For a and c being strategic complements for her (i.e. @a

@c > 0), a protest leader will be
more active while confronting a less pacist occupier if: (i). @
2a
@@c < 0; (ii). 
 @2p@a2  >   @2f@a2  at c; and
(iii).
@a@c dcd  > @a@  : Under these conditions, the protest movement has greater mass-support when the
occupier is less pacist.
Proof: See appendix 2. 
In the above proposition, a and c are strategic complements, so a protest leader is able to raise her payo¤
by complementing an increase in permissiveness with greater activity. As mentioned before, strategic com-
plementarity arises if the gain in conversion more than o¤sets the change in punishment, when both activity
and permissiveness increase. This could happen if population becomes su¢ ciently more responsive to their
leaders activities or propaganda in a more permissive environment. Conversely, this also means that even
in a more permissive environment, the protest leader has to increase activity in order to increase her payo¤
by winning a su¢ cient number of converts. One might imagine that this population is not prone to rebellion
in the rst place, and the combination of increased permissiveness by the controller, and exhortion by the
protest leader, is necessary to induce them tojoin the movement.
Note that a less pacist occupier is more permissive in this particular case. What causes the less pacist
occupier to be more permissive? First, the condition @
2a
@@c < 0 implies that in this case, when faced with
a less pacist occupier (a rise in ), the reaction function of the protest leader will be steeper. So, a less
pacist occupier make the latter less willing to increase activity, even if there is a reduced amount of policing
(greater permissiveness). This is understandable, as this occupier would instruct even the smaller police
force to punish protestors harshly.
Second, notice that 
 @2p@a2  >   @2f@a2 . Note that as  = , there is a greater chance of this inequality
being satised for a less pacist occupier with higher . As per this inequality, the occupiers enforcement
costs grow at a substantial rate (greater than the growth of the conversion rate) for an increase in protest
activity. So, the occupier needs to nd a way to manage these costs. It does this by decreasing the level
of policing (more permissiveness). This, in the end, leads to more activity. So, the less pacist occupier
33 In graphical terms, the iso-utility map of the occupier undergoes a change, and there is also a shift in the reaction function
of the protest leaders. The combination of these two factors produces a change in the equilibrium outcome.
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actually faces greater activity, but cutting back on the level of policing saves greatly on enforcement costs.
Note that if this cutback does not occur, given its natural proclivity (or maybe in case of a government, its
pre-committed electoral manifesto), it will use the bigger police force or army to punish so much, that there
will be huge enforcement costs.
Finally, the condition
@a@c dcd  > @a@  needs to hold. This is needed because a less pacist occupier has
two e¤ects for the protest leader. First, there is a negative e¤ect on their activity. Second, their activity
level is also a¤ected by how this type of occupier varies c, compared to a more pacist one. In this case c
increases, and combined with the strategic complementarity of a and c, there is a positive e¤ect on activity
level. This positive e¤ect needs to outweigh the negative one, for the net amount of activity to increase.
Further, as per the proposition, not only is the protest leader more active, but the protest movement has
greater mass-support under these circumstances, as both permissiveness and activity level go up.
The above proposition has interesting real world implications. It seems that more pacist occupiers are able
to maintain their military strength in occupied areas, and discourage protest activities. However, the lack of
restraint of more less pacist occupiers make the cost of maintaining military strength too much for them,
as due to their predisposition for harshness, they use the military to an extent that is very costly for them
(perhaps in terms of international sanctions, etc.). Hence, they are forced to consider a cutback of their
military from the occupied area, which leads to greater activity by the protest leaders, and the growth of
the protest movement.34
Proposition 4: For a and c being strategic substitutes for her (i.e. @a

@c > 0), a protest leader will be
more active while confronting a less pacist occupier if: (i). @
2a
@@c > 0; (ii).
 @2f@a2  <   @2p@a2  at c;
(iii).  < 1
[ @p@c ]
h
(fa + pa)
@2a
@@c +

@
@
h
 @f@a + 
@p
@a
i
@a
@c
i
; and (iv).
@a@c dcd  > @a@  : Under these
conditions, the protest movement has lesser mass-support when the occupier is less pacist.
Proof: The proof of the rst part of the proposition is similar to the proof of proposition 3. In this case,
observe that for an increase in , the occupier maximizes its utility by decreasing c as its best response. To
prove the second part of the statement suppose that for a more pacist occupier (i.e. when  was lower), the
payo¤ level was 0, for strategy pair (a0; c0) and conversion level f0. Note that for an increase in , keeping c
xed at c0, a would decline (as @a

@ < 0): In that case, let the occupiers payo¤ be denoted by 
1, for strategy
pair (a1; c0). For 1 let enforcement costs be E1 and conversion level f1. Note that given the properties of
the conversion function, f1 < f0. However, the occupier chooses to decrease c, and not keep it xed at c0,
taking it to payo¤ level to  with strategy pair (a; c), with enforcement costs E and conversion level f.
Then it must be that  > 1. But as c < c0 and a > a1, it must be that E > E1 (from the properties
34Though admittedly, such cutbacks by a pacist government would have caused an even greater escalation. However, due
to its restraint, a pacist government does not have to undertake such cutbacks.
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of the punishment function). In that case,  > 1, only if f < f1. Given f1 < f0, the properties of the
conversion function ensure that f < f0. Thus, the protest movement has lesser mass-support when the
occupier is less pacist.
In this case, a and c are strategic substitutes, so less permissiveness by the occupier brings about greater
activity by the protest leader. If permissiveness declines, the only way the protest leader can maintain a level
of conversion (hence maintaining their payo¤ somewhat) is by increasing activity. This is possible because
the population is more receptive to the protest leader for a decline in permissiveness. As mentione before,
this may be a population more prone to rebel in the rst place, and the controllers action aggravates them
further.
From the proof of the proposition, it is noted that a more less pacist occupier is less permissive in this case.
There are reasons why the less pacist occupier has lower permissiveness. First, the condition @
2a
@@c > 0
implies that for a less pacist occupier, the reaction function (@a=@c) is of the protest leader is atter. In
this case, a less pacist occupier make the protest leader more willing to take advantage of permissiveness.
As permissiveness can cause substantial losses for it, the occupier is driven towards less permissiveness.
The second condition that needs to be met is
 @2f@a2  <   @2p@a2 . As a and c are strategic substitutes, if the
occupier decreases c, the protest leader will increase a. This increase in a should not succeed in converting
people to the movement, beyond a certain level. Thus, in absolute terms their rate of conversion to the
protest movement due to an increase in a (or @
2f
@a2 ) should not be too high.
Further, the cost of increasing policing (again, perhaps in terms of international boycotts, casualty rates
of soldiers, etc.) should not be too high. This is captures in the proposition by the fact that the scaling
parameter , which translates punishment levels into enforcement costs for the occupier, should be su¢ ciently
low. Only then will the less pacist occupier be in a position to raise its policing level.35
Finally, the condition
@a@c dcd  > @a@  is needed. As mentioned before, there is a negative e¤ect on the
activity of protest leader, for a less pacist occupier, who punishes more (i.e.@a

@ < 0). However, in this
case, a less pacist occupier decreases c. Combined with the strategic substitutability of a and c, there is a
positive e¤ect on activity level. This positive e¤ect needs to outweigh the negative one, for the net amount
of activity to increase.
To summarize, the population is prone to conversion in this case. The enforcement costs are low enough
for the occupier vis-a-vis the possible loss from conversion. In this situation, a less pacist occupier might
increase the size of the occupational force. Given this, the protest leaders have to raise their activities to
win converts and preserve their movement to whatever extent possible.If the population reacts to this by
35 Interestingly, the condition on parameter  does not appear in proposition 3, as there the controller becomes more permissive,
opposite to what we have here.
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becoming more receptive to the protest leadership, then it is possible for the latter to keep the movement
alive by increasing their activity level, in the face of increased policing. Overall, under these circumstances,
there will be a reduction in the populations participation in the protest movement.
It is observed in this section that a less pacist occupier can lead to a more active protest leaders under
two circumstances. However, depending on population characteristics and punishment costs, these there are
di¤erent implications for the nature of protest, depending on the particular circumstance. Thus, it is essential
to closely analyze the population characteristics, punishment structure, and the details of enforcement costs,
in order to reach proper conclusions regarding the e¤ect of the occupiers pacist tendencies on the protest
movement.36
4 Conclusion
A simple model has been developed in this paper to examine two important questions related to the nature
of protest (or independence) movements in regions under occupation (or disputed regions). First, how is the
nature of a protest movement a¤ected by the opportunity costs of the leaders who lead these movements?
Second, how is the nature of the movement a¤ected by the intrinsic level of pacism (or hawkishness) of
the occupiers? These questions are motivated by facts observed in historical liberation struggles (e.g. the
Indian Independence Movement) and present day conicts (e.g. the Israeli-Palestinian conict). The answers
to these questions are relevant in truly understanding the nature of such conicts, and will assist in their
successful managment.
My results indicate that under certain circumstances, leaders who have a greater opportunity cost of leading
protests may be more active against the occupier, compared to leaders with lower opportunity costs. Also,
under certain specied conditions, the former may be able to lead a movement with more mass support.
It is demonstrated that greater activity by the protest leaders can arise under two very di¤erent cases.
In the rst case, the occupier reduces the level of monitoring when faced with protest leaders with high
opportunity costs (and saves signicant enforcement costs). In the second case, the occupier actually enforces
stricter monitoring of the protestors, but the protest leaders increase their activities to overcome this stricter
enforcement. I specify the conditions which lead to the rst case, and those that lead to the second. As can
be imagined, in both cases, the actions of the occupier and the protest leaders have specic e¤ects on the
level of mass involvement in the protest.
The model also indicates that having a less pacist occupier might actually lead to greater activity by
36 It would be interesting to study the Israeli-Palestine conict in the context of our analysis. Once the fundamentals of
the conict are identied (population characteristics, etc.), it might be possible to analyze how the nature of successive Israeli
governments (which varied in their attitudes) impacted the nature of the conict. As part of future work, the validity of this
papers ndings may be tested in that context.
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the protest leaders. This particular outcome occurs under two di¤erent sets of circumstances. In the rst
circumstance, we observe greater monitoring of the protestors by the less pacist occupier. In the second
situation, the less pacist occupier actually cuts back on the level of monitoring, due to high enforcement
costs. As might be imagined, these two situations have di¤erent outcomes in terms of mass participation in
the protest.
A major contribution of this paper lies in identifying and characterizing the priors which lead to the above
outcomes. These priors involve the characteristics of the population residing in the occupied region, the
nature of punishment that is being meted out to the protestors, and enforcement costs. Di¤erent priors lead
to the nature of various protest movements being di¤erent in some crucial aspects, though they might be
similar in other aspects. No doubt, a comprehensive characterization of these priors is essential in clearly
distinguishing the fundamental di¤erences between various protest movements, as well as identifying the
similarities they might share. This understanding might prove crucial in developing tailor-made conict
management strategies in the context of a particular protest or liberation movement.37
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Proof of proposition 1
Proof: From the FOC of the occupier :
dc
d jc=c =  
@F=@ 
@F=@c jc=c =  
 
h
(fa+pa ) @
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@a ]
@a
@c )
i
@2=@c2 jc=c
Now, the denominator is always negative for the payo¤ function of the occupier being concave at c.
So, if @F=@ jc=c > 0, then dcd jc=c > 0:
But @F=@ jc=c > 0, only if
h
(fa + pa)
@2a
@ @c +

@
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h
 @f@a + 
@p
@a
i
@a
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< 0:
Now, fa and pa are positive (from the assumptions on fa and pa) .
And, @a

@c jc=c
> 0 for a and c being strategic complements.
Hence for @
2a
@ @c
jc=c
< 0 and @@ 
h
 @f@a + 
@p
@a
i
jc=c
< 0, we have dcd jc=c > 0:
(Note that @@ 
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 @f@a + 
@p
@a
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=
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@2p
@a2
i
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As per Lemma 1, @a

@ < 0,
So @@ 
h
 @f@a + 
@p
@a
i
< 0 only if
 @2p@a2  >   @2f@a2  at c = c(recalling that faa < 0 and paa > 0)]
Now, da

d jc=c
=

@a
@c
dc
d +
@a
@ 

jc=c
As @a

@ < 0, it follows that for
@a
@c jc=c
> 0 and dc

d > 0; we have
da
d > 0 if
@a@c dcd  > @a@  at c = c:
The rst part of proposition 1 follows from the above conditions.
Now, as dc

d > 0 and
da
d > 0, we have
df
d > 0, given fa > 0 and fc > 0 (per assumption):
Hence under the conditions of the proposition the protest movement has greater mass support for a higher-
cost leadership 
Appendix 2: Proof of proposition 3
Proof: Applying the implicit function theorem to the FOC of the occupier:
dc
d jc=c =  
@F=@
@F=@c jc=c =  
 
h
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2a
@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@
@ [
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@a ]
@a
@c )+pc
i
@2=@c2 jc=c
The denominator is always negative for the payo¤ function of the occupier being concave at c.
So, if @F=@jc=c > 0, then dcd jc=c > 0:
But, @F=@jc=c > 0 only if
h
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@2a
@@c +

@
@
h
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
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< 0:
Now, fa and pa are positive, and pc is negative.
And, @a

@c jc=c
> 0 for a and c being strategic complements.
Hence for @
2a
@@c
jc=c
< 0 and @@
h
 @f@a + 
@p
@a
i
jc=c
< 0, we have dcd jc=c > 0:
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(Note that @@
h
 @f@a + 
@p
@a
i
=
h
 @
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@2p
@a2
i
@a
@ )
As per Lemma 3, @a

@ < 0,
So @@
h
 @f@a + 
@p
@a
i
< 0 only if
 @2p@a2  >   @2f@a2  at c = c (recalling that faa < 0 and paa > 0)]
Further, we have da

d =

@a
@c
dc
d +
@a
@

As @a

@ < 0, it follows that for
@a
@c jc=c
> 0 ; and dcd jc=c > 0; we have
da
d > 0 if
@a@c dcd  > @a@  at c = c:
The rst part of proposition 3 follows from the above conditions.
To prove the second part of the proposition, observe that as dc

d > 0 and
da
d > 0, we have
df
d > 0; given
fa > 0 and fc > 0 (per assumption):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